WASHINGTON — As the 1991 Persian Gulf war drew to a close, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf told an anxious nation that an American-led juggernaut had swept across the desert, stunned its foe and evicted Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait.
"We've accomplished our mission," the commander declared in a presentation deemed such a tour de force that it was known as "the mother of all briefings."
"The gate is closed," he added confidently, on Iraq's "war machine."
Now, General Schwarzkopf's death, and the hospitalization of former President George Bush, 88, have returned the spotlight to the war they prosecuted together, which some of its architects have cast as a model for a successful intervention abroad.
The gulf war appeared to have it all: a foreign tyrant who committed an indisputable act of aggression, a president who rallied the international community to roll back the occupation of a defenseless oil-rich nation, and an American military eager to prove itself in its most demanding test since Vietnam.
For some former officials it was, plain and simple, the "good war" — a war that set limited objectives against an invader, was waged in a mere six weeks and was then punctuated by victory parades. The battles yet to come, more open-ended conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, proved to be far more costly in lives and treasure.
And yet the Persian Gulf war occupies a more complex place in military history than the hagiography suggests. The generalship was not without its faults, and the White House decision to bring the conflict to a close before all of Mr. Hussein's Republican Guard divisions were destroyed has remained a subject of debate, even among ranking officers who were on the battlefield.
The 1991 gulf conflict may have been a "war of necessity," as its supporters say, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq a "war of choice." But it was the outcome of the first gulf war, which left Mr. Hussein in power and forced the United States to carry out more than a decade of air patrols over northern and southern Iraq, that presented the United States with that choice.
The act that precipitated the gulf conflict was Mr. Hussein's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, an attack that caught the White House flat-footed despite intelligence warning of the Iraqis' military preparations.
The first task was the defense of Saudi Arabia, which General Schwarzkopf's command took on from a position of considerable disadvantage. His Central Command, based in Tampa, Fla., had no forces to speak of in the region, or even a regional headquarters.
As the months went by, the planning shifted to offense as Mr. Bush and his team set their sights on evicting Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
Mr. Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III secured the backing of the United Nations Security Council and garnered broad international support. Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and even Syria were part of the fighting coalition.
Maintaining support at home was more challenging. The Senate resolution authorizing the use of force was adopted by a narrow vote of 52 to 47. (Senators Al Gore of Tennessee, Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut and Harry Reid of Nevada were among the Democrats who voted for the measure, but Senators John Kerry of Massachusetts and Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware voted "no," as did Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia.)
Iraq had a formidable arsenal of chemical weapons. Yielding to American warnings, the Iraqis did not employ poison gas. But nobody on the American side could be sure it would not be used.
Guided by Gen. Colin L. Powell, who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States assembled an overwhelming force. The four-day ground war was preceded by more than five weeks of bombardment.
When the shooting ended, it was clear that the all-volunteer military had been a success. Stealth aircraft and precision weapons had proved themselves on the battlefield. Though the United States deployed about 540,000 personnel, 148 were killed in action or died of their wounds, according to the Defense Department.
Importantly, the ghosts of Vietnam had been exorcised. For the first time since that bloody war in Southeast Asia, the United States armed forces demonstrated that they could win a major land war in a foreign land.
Still, the gulf war was not as decisive as some of its proponents had hoped.
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